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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Counsel for Appellee has misstated and set forth an erroneous 
set of facts, which facts have been misapplied to the statutes in 
this case. The application of the statutes to said facts, as 
suggested by Appellee, would have a disastrous effect on employers 
in Utah. Appellee resorts to attacking the credibility of B. Ray 
Zoll, and to attacking certain procedures followed by Appellant, 
in order to mask the fact that the evidence in the Record simply 
does not support the Findings as signed by the trial court. 
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Moreover, the following facts, which are undisputed, require 
close review by this Court: (1) Appellee Asay did not meet his 
billable hours requirement, which was an expectation of Appellant, 
and a condition of Asay's employment [R 984, R 966, R 976 R 1110, 
R 1057, R 1065]; (2) Asay replaced the 1987 hard disk with a 1984 
hard disk, the effect of which was to lessen the fair market value 
of the computer [R 999, R 1092, R 1098]; (3) Asay used the 
password, "fuckoff" to block access to the files, and although he 
later revealed this password to Appellant, there were additional 
passwords which continued to block access to important files and 
to attorney work product [R 941, R 1042, R 1082, R 1083]; 
In addition, (4) Asay filed bankruptcy after this case had 
begun, and abandoned his claims against Zoll & Branch, the effect 
of which was to cause delay [R 1029, R 1030]; (5) Asay was aware 
that he could have had access to the $1175.00 amount tendered to 
the Court by Zoll & Branch, and admitted that he did not seek the 
amount as a matter of legal strategy [R 1029]; (6) Zoll & Branch 
suffered damages in excess of the amount purportedly owed to Asay, 
as the result of Asay's actions regarding the computer system [R 
980, R 1116]; (7) There was no finding by the trial court that the 
purported withholding of payment to Asay by Zoll & Branch amounted 
to a willful failure to pay wages justly due to Asay; (8) There 
was a bona fide dispute between the parties in this case as to the 
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amount due to As ay, if any, and there was no finding that there 
was not a bona fide dispute; (9) Asay voluntarily left his 
employment with Zoll & Branch, and was not terminated [R 939]. 
It should be kept in mind throughout this appeal that Asay 
himself is an attorney, as well as a computer expert* Therefore, 
pursuant to the policy considerations behind the statutes at issue 
in this case, Asay does not fall into the category of an 
unprotected employee, who is lacking in equal bargaining power. 
In fact, Mr. Asay virtually held Zoll & Branch hostage with his 
ability to sabotage the law office's computer system, and blocked 
access to completed briefs and memoranda, for which there were 
imminent deadlines. Asay engaged in this type of behavior in 
order that his demands for money and equipment would be met. 
This Court must consider the overall legal effect on 
employers in Utah, who are dealing with unscrupulous employees who 
have the ability to use the wage statutes, if so broadly applied 
as they were in this case, as a club. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE WAGE STATUTES WERE MISINTERPRETED AND MISAPPLIED 
In Appellee's Brief, it is argued that the trial court 
properly interpreted the applicable wage statute, Utah Code 
Annotated §34-28-5 (1969), and that said statute should be 
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analyzed in accordance with a "plain meaning" standard. However, 
it is apparent by the plain meaning of the statute that the 
penalty provision is intended to apply only to subsection (1), 
which it directly follows, and not to subsection (2). 
Section 34-28-5 provides: 
(1) Whenever an employer separates an employee 
from his payroll, the unpaid wages shall become due 
immediately, and the employer shall pay such wages to 
the employee within 24 hours of the time of 
separation at the specified place of employment. 
In case of failure to pay wages due an employee 
within 24 hours of demand therefor, the wages of such 
employee shall continue from the date of separation 
until paid, but in no event to exceed sixty days, 
at the same rate which the employee received at the 
time of separation. The employee may recover the 
penalty thus accruing to him in a civil action. This 
action must be commenced within sixty days from the 
date of separation. Any employee who has not made 
a demand for payment shall not be entitled to any such 
penalty under this subsection. 
(2) Whenever an employee (not having a written 
contract for a definite period) quits or resigns 
his employment, the wages earned shall become due and 
payable not later than 72 hours thereafter, unless such 
employee shall have given 72 hours' previous notice of 
his intention to quit, in which latter case such 
employee shall receive his wages at the specified 
place of payment at the time of quitting [emphasis 
added]. 
The term "separation", which is used only in subsection (1), is 
set forth in the penalty provision. If the penalty provision were 
meant to apply to subsection (2) as well, it would be placed after 
both subsections. 
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Furthermore, the language used by the Utah Supreme Court 
reflects the intention that the penalty provision is meant to 
apply only to the situation where an employer terminates an 
employee. For instance, in Hollev v. Sullivan, 497 P.2d 630 (Utah 
1972), the Court held, in reference to this penalty provision, 
that it applies to "paying a person whose services have been 
terminated by the employer [emphasis added]". 
In support of his position, Appellee cites Silver v. Tax 
Commission, 820 P.2d 912 (Utah 1991), in which it is held that, 
"In construing the statute, we follow the rule that the terms of a 
statute should not be interpreted in a piecemeal fashion, but as a 
whole." However, in that very case the Court, in interpreting the 
plain meaning of the term "intent to evade", examined the 
structure of the section, and determined that the juxtaposition of 
subparts was indicative of legislative intent. It follows that in 
the present case one must examine the placement of the penalty 
provision, which follows subsection (1), and mirrors the language 
used only in subsection (1). Therefore, pursuant to the plain 
meaning of this statute, the penalty provision was only intended 
to apply when an employee has been terminated by an employer. 
Furthermore, the penalty statute applies only when there has 
been a willful failure to pay the employee, upon separation. 
Chatterlev v. Omnico, Inc., 485 P.2d 667, 670 (1971). As set 
5 
forth in Appellant's Brief, there was no finding by the trial 
court of a willful failure to pay by Appellant. There was merely 
a finding that Zoll & Branch stopped payment on the checks it 
issued to Asay due to Zoll's purported anger at the password 
[Finding No. 22]. However, payment was stopped due to the concern 
for gaining access to important materials on the computer system 
[R 980, R 1114, R 1116, R 1021, R 1054, R 1055, R 1076]. 
Appellee claims that the wages were not "paid", and that 
there was no tender thereof, in that there was not a "bona fide, 
unconditional, offer of payment of the amount of money due, 
coupled with an actual production of the money or its equivalent," 
citing the requirements set forth in Zions Properties, Inc. v. 
Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975). However, Appellant 
continues to maintain that the wages were not "unpaid," inasmuch 
as the entire amount thereof was in fact duly tendered and "paid" 
to the Court. 
Appellee claims that Appellant gave instructions to the court 
clerk to hold the money until Asay "proved his entitlement" 
thereto, and that this precludes the validity of the tender. This 
instruction was never given to the Court by Appellant, and 
Appellant provided to the Court notification of a Tender of 
Payment with a copy of the Complaint [see Exhibit "A"]. Moreover, 
it was held in Kellev v. Leucadia Financial Corp., docket #900187 
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(Utah 1992), that in order to be valid, a tender must not contain 
an improper condition or requirement. 
In the present case, all Mr. Asay would have had to do to 
have access to and to collect the wages was to file a motion with 
the Industrial Commission, or the Court itself. Instead, the 
Appellee took over one year to proceed through bankruptcy, have 
the claim abandoned as a no-value claim [R 1029, R 1030], and then 
reassert it in his Counterclaim. Appellee ran up $12,000 in 
attorney's fees using the wage statute to leverage the Appellant 
into paying a non-meritorious claim, all the while knowing that he 
could have had access to the initial amount [R 1027, R 1029]. 
In addition, Zoll & Branch did not merely offer to produce 
the money, but in fact there was an "actual production of the 
money" for deposit to the court, as is required for a valid 
tender, and the money was out of the control of Zoll & Branch, and 
not held as a benefit to Zoll & Branch, as opposed to the 
situation of a controlling employer holding all the cards. Thus, 
there was an "actual production" of the money, as is required for 
a valid tender. Washington National Insurance Co. v. Sherwood 
Associates, 795 P.2d 665 (Utah App. 1990). Carr v. Enoch Smith 
Co., 781 P.2d 1292, 1294 (Utah App. 1989). 
Moreover, in one of the cases cited in Appellee's own Brief, 
Fitzgerald v. Corbett, 793 P.2d 356 (Utah 1990), it was held that 
7 
"where the unreasonable conduct of the obligee would make an 
actual tender a fruitless gesture, an offer to comply with the 
terms of the contract by the obligor is sufficient." If Appellant 
paid the amount directly to Appellee, it would have been left 
unprotected, in light of the damages caused by Appellee. By 
paying the amount to Court, the Appellee was protected in knowing 
the money was there, in dispute and available upon his convincing 
a judge to release it to him. 
Asay promised Appellant he would deliver work product and any 
property belonging to Appellant, but he did not do so. Therefore, 
inasmuch as Appellant claimed damages against Asay, a tender 
directly to Asay would have been fruitless, and would not have 
protected the interests of Appellant. In addition, as 
established above and in Appellant's Brief, it has been admitted 
by Asay that he elected not to make any attempt whatsoever to 
collect the money, due to a "legal strategy". Therefore, Appellee 
cannot now claim that the tender was "conditional" merely because 
he, knowing he had the option, chose not to collect the amount. 
Accordingly, the wage and penalty statutes do not apply, by reason 
of the fact that payment was in fact made to Appellee. 
As an additional matter, Appellee cites Rule 68(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that: 
When in an action for the recovery of money only, the 
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defendant alleges in his answer that before the commence-
ment of the action he tendered to the plaintiff the full 
amount to which the plaintiff was entitled, and thereupon 
deposits in court for the plaintiff the amount so tendered, 
and the allegation is found to be true, the plaintiff 
cannot recover costs, but must pay costs to the defendant 
[emphasis added]. 
However, in the present case, the causes of action claimed by both 
parties include more than the recovery of money. Therefore, this 
Rule never was applicable or relevant in this case, and applies 
for the protection of Defendants. Therefore, Appellant would be 
the benefactor of such a statute, and not Appellee. 
Additionally, there was a bona fide dispute as to whether or 
not the wages were "justly due" to Mr. Asay, inasmuch as he had 
breached his employment agreement and had otherwise caused damage 
to Appellant, pursuant to language in Chatterlev v. Omnico, 485 
P.2d 667, 670 (Utah App. 1971). Appellant has attacked the 
findings of fact in its Appellate Brief, and moreover, there was 
no finding whatsoever stating that there was not a bona fide 
dispute, nor was there a finding that there was a willful failure 
to pay. Accordingly, the wage statute does not apply. 
Appellee points to the Findings of Fact, wherein it is stated 
that Appellant stopped payment due to the fact that Zoll was 
angered by Asay, and that Appellant filed suit only as a tactic to 
pressure Asay into abandoning his claims against Appellant. 
However, neither the Court transcript from the hearing nor the 
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evidence supports these Findings, the wording of which was created 
entirely by counsel for Appellee. The trial court judge merely 
signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as prepared by 
counsel for Appellee, and entered judgment in favor of Appellee by 
signing a Judgment which was also prepared by counsel for 
Appellee. 
Moreover, the fact that Appellants tendered/paid the money to 
the Court negates the element of a "willful failure to pay" Asay. 
The majority rule, as derived from both Chatterley v. Omnico, 
Inc., 485 P.2d 667 (Utah 1971), and from other states* case law, 
as cited and argued in Appellant's Brief, is that the penalty 
provision in such a wage statute does not apply if there is a bona 
fide dispute over the claimed wages. This issue was never 
addressed in the Findings of Fact. Therefore, the statutes in 
this case have been misapplied, due to the erroneous Findings of 
Fact, and the lower court's decision should be reversed. 
II. THE ATTACK ON THE CREDIBILITY OF B. RAY ZOLL IS 
INEFFECTIVE 
In Appellee's Brief it is alleged on numerous occasions that 
the testimony of B. Ray Zoll lacked credibility. In Finding No. 
32, it is stated that, "During the trial of the above-entitled 
actions, the testimony of Mr. Asay was more credible than the 
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testimony of Mr. Zoll." Appellee then cites to the deposition of 
Gary Wilmoref and to the testimony of Michael Drake, both of whom 
were witnesses on his behalf. 
However, at no time does Appellee mention in his Brief, nor 
are there any Findings of Fact as to the credibility of the 
testimony of Tom Branch. Branch's testimony was proferredf the 
substance of which was to corroborate and verify the entirety of 
the testimony of B. Ray Zoll, with the exception of testimony 
pertaining to the billing sheets [R 1117]. The testimony and 
credibility of Mr. Branch has never been attacked, and was not 
even mentioned within the Findings of Fact. 
The Findings of Fact clearly do not support the record 
insofar as they are silent as to the credibility of, and testimony 
proferred by, Mr. Branch, which testimony is virtually unrebutted. 
Therefore, the attack on the credibility of Zoll, for which there 
is very little and highly disputed evidence, but which Appellee 
relies upon repeatedly and heavily in arguing its position in this 
case, is largely irrelevant, inasmuch as the proferred testimony 
of Branch stands unrebutted and unimpeached, verifying each fact 
testified to by B. Ray Zoll. 
Furthermore Appellee, in attacking the credibility of Mr. 
Zoll, and attempting to paint a picture of disrespect on the part 
of Zoll, refers to the August 2, 1993 hearing on augmentation of 
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attorney's feesf wherein Zoll exited the courtroom. Appellee 
claims that Appellant waived its right to cross-examination by 
failing to offer an argument in support of its position at that 
hearing, and by refraining from cross-examination. 
However, Appellant duly filed a Memorandum with the Court 
prior to that hearing, objecting to the attorney's fees and 
stating why said fees should not be awarded or augmented. Said 
fees were rebutted prior to Zoll's departure from the court room, 
and in fact in his opening statement to the Court, Zoll stated 
that the fees were exorbitant [see excerpt from Transcript of 
August 2, 1993 hearing attached hereto as Exhibit "B"]. 
In addition, at the original hearing, the Third Judicial 
District Court expressly stated that Zoll & Branch would be 
entitled to cross-examine counsel for Appellee as to attorney 
fees, which opportunity they were never given. Therefore, if any 
opportunity for cross-examination was waived by the walking out of 
Mr. Zoll, it would have only been in regards to the claim for 
augmented fees, which was at issue at that hearing. 
As a final note, Appellant wishes to make the record clear 
relative to Zoll's reasons for departing the court room, and to 
represent the frustration felt in attempting to deal with the 
lower court judge and his staff. In 16 years, counsel has never 
had such a problem with trying to get a hearing on his motions, 
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with locating files lost by the Court, and with the Court's 
allowing the supersedeas bond to be improperly cashed. Appellant 
could only get hearings before Judge Rokich on these matters. 
Counsel for Appellant knew that the case would be appealed, 
and argued that at the time the Notice of Appeal was filed the 
lower court was divested of jurisdiction. Therefore, in order to 
avoid further conflict with the lower court, counsel for Appellant 
felt it better to proffer his argument, and to make his exit. 
Counsel for Appellant never expected an ex parte motion for 
cashing the supersedeas bond, subsequent to said departure. 
Appellant's Affidavit of Recusal of this trial court judge 
were subsequently filed. However, since the date when counsel for 
Appellant exited the courtroom, he has reappeared before this 
trial court judge without incident, acting professionally, which 
behavior will continue. Appellant prefers that this unfortunate 
but harmless incident be forgotten. However, this is not possible 
when counsel for Appellee continues to exploit it. 
III. THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD 
Appellee argues that Appellant has failed to marshal the 
evidence in support of the Findings of Fact, and that Appellant's 
appeal procedure is technically deficient. However, Appellant did 
cite to the record, to the only possible evidence which could 
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support these Findings. In Appellant's Brief, it properly attacks 
the Findings of Fact, and shows that many of the facts which 
Appellant attempted to marshal by Appellant were unrebutted. 
Appellee is clearly attempting to ride on the coattails of 
the Court of Appeals' decision pertaining to a marshaling of the 
evidence in Commercial Union Assoc, v. Clayton,, 863 P.2d 29 (Utah 
App. 1993), a case in which counsel for Appellant was involved. 
Howeverf in the present case, Appellant has in fact gone through 
the exercise of citing each and every place in the Record which 
Appellant believes is relevant, in support of each factual 
finding, prior to citing to the record to evidence which 
controverts the factual findings focused upon. Therefore, the 
Court's decision in Clayton is irrelevant for the purposes of the 
present case, and the Appellee's citation thereto is included only 
for purposes of masking the real issues in this case. 
Moreover, Appellee's attempts to divert this Court's 
attention from the real issues in this case by making the argument 
that the Appellent's procedure for appeal is deficient, inasmuch 
as Appellent supposedly did not appeal the underlying judgment, 
but "only appeals the denial of a Motion for New Trial or Motion 
to Reconsider." However, in its Notice of Appeal, Appellant 
stated that it "appeals the judgment entered in the above-
captioned case . .[emphasis added]". By appealing the Order 
14 
Releasing the Bond and Augmenting Attorney's fees and the Order 
denying Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative, Motion for 
Alter or Amend Findings, in effect Appellant has appealed the 
underlying judgment. This is a frivolous argument by Appellee, 
and yet one more attempt to mask the real issues in this case. 
The truth is, in the present case there is very little if no 
evidence to support many of the Third District Court's factual 
findings. The findings, which were drafted entirely by and in the 
exact words of counsel for Appellee, took purported evidence out 
of context, creatively extrapolated from the record, and in sum 
did not represent the true nature of the evidence presented at the 
time of trial. These Findings of Fact were erroneously and 
summarily signed by Judge Michael Murphy, without providing the 
Appellant the opportunity for a hearing thereon. 
There are numerous examples of such mischaracterization which 
make the trial court's approval of the Findings of Fact clearly 
erroneous. The Appellee leads this Court to believe that when the 
password "fuckoff" was provided to Zoll & Branch, access to all of 
the files could be had in a matter of seconds. This is not the 
case, and Appellant believes the lower court clearly did not hear 
the testimony of Van Valkenberg, Appellant's computer expert, who 
stated that there were other vulgar passwords, in addition to the 
initial password, which blocked access [R 1082, R 1083]: 
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Q: (Zoll) Were there other passwords that you didn't 
have, you discovered [emphasis added]? 
A: (Van Valkenburg) Yes. There were—There was not 
absolutely just the one password used. There were 
several passwords used [emphasis added]. 
Moreover, even after the initial password had been given, Gary 
Willmore had to keep calling Asay to get his assistance in gaining 
access to the files [R 988]. 
Appellee claims, in reference to Finding of Fact #5, that 
there was evidence in the Record of mistrust of Zoll on the part 
of Appellee. However, the only evidence of said "mistrust" is at 
R 941, wherein Asay himself admitted his motivations, stating that 
he locked up the system as a "way of exercising leverage" in the 
negotiations with Zoll & Branch [R 941 at line 20]. Moreover, in 
Finding of Fact #8, it is stated that the time billed by Asay was 
fair and consistent with his employment obligations. However, 
Asay himself admitted that the agreement and expectation was that 
he would bill 7 - 8 hours per day [R 966, 976], even though he had 
only billed 4 hours per day [R 984]. 
In Finding of Fact #11, it is stated that Zoll & Branch 
agreed to pay $1030.00 to Asay, which represented the fair market 
value of the computer system, and that Asay had represented all 
material facts relative thereto. However, Appellant's expert, Van 
Valkenburg, testified that since the 1987 hard disk had been 
replaced with a 1984 hard disk, which fact was not disclosed to 
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Zoll & Branch, the effect would be to lessen the fair market value 
of the system [R 1092, R 1098, R 1104]. 
In addition, in Finding of Fact #15, it is stated that there 
was no sabotage of the computer system by Asay. However, Asay 
himself admits that he locked up the computer, using a vulgar 
password [R 941, R 1042]. There is evidence in the Record, from 
the testimony of Appellant's computer expert, that the system was 
indeed locked up even after Asay provided the initial password [R 
1082, R 1083, R 988]. Furthermore, in Finding of Fact #16, it is 
stated that any problems had by Zoll & Branch with the computer 
was due to their own lack of training. However, Appellant's own 
computer expert, Van Valkenburg, could still not get access to the 
files [R 1082, R 1083], nor could Gary Wilmore [R 988]. 
Furthermore, in Finding of Fact #17, it is stated that none 
of Asay's actions regarding the computer system were improper. 
However, he has admitted to locking up the system, which was owned 
by Zoll & Branch, upon which Zoll & Branch was making payments [R 
941, R 1042]. As established above, even after the initial 
password was provided, access to the system was still blocked. In 
addition, Appellant's computer expert stated that he thought 
Asay's actions regarding the computer were abnormal [R 1104]. 
In Finding of Fact #19, it is stated that Asay properly left 
behind his work product and time sheets. However, it was 
17 
testified to by Zoll and would have also been testified to by 
Steve Branch [R 1113] that the sheets were not properly submitted. 
In Finding of Fact #22, it is stated in part that the sole reason 
Zoll & Branch stopped payment on the check was because they were 
angered by the password "fuckoff". However, it was testified to 
by both Zoll, and proferred by Tom Branch, that there was a great 
concern for getting access to critical files and attorney work 
product in the computer system. Payment was stopped on the check 
for this reason [R 980, R 1116], as well as for the reason that 
Asay had otherwise violated his employment agreement with Zoll & 
Branch, as supported herein by the Record. There is no evidence 
of "anger" in the record on the part of Zoll. Finally, in 
reference to Findings of Fact #25 - 38, Appellant refers the 
Court to its initial Brief, wherein these are addressed. 
IV. IN ACCORDANCE WITH POLICY CONSIDERATIONS BEHIND THE 
WAGE STATUTES, THE PENALTY PROVISION AND ATTORNEY'S 
FEES CLAUSE SHOULD NOT APPLY 
In the case of Chatterlv, cited supra, it is apparent that 
the legislative intent for, and policy behind, Utah Code Annotated 
§34-28-5 is to impose sanctions only where there has been a 
willful failure to pay by an employer, in the absence of any bona 
fide dispute over the payment of the wages. This statute 
represents a legislative effort to protect employees, who 
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historically have had less bargaining power than employers. 
Howeverf in this case Appellant continues to maintain that it 
is the employee who has wronged the employer. The employee is an 
attorney himselff and furthermore has extensive knowledge of 
computers. In any event, Plaintiff's tender/payment of the 
disputed amount to the Court and the presence of a bona fide 
dispute over the wages serves to negate the element of a willful 
failure to pay an employee. As established in the Record, 
Appellee was aware of the fact that he could easily have access to 
the wages, and voluntarily chose not to gain access thereto. 
There are no findings by the Court that there was a willful 
failure to pay, or as to whether or not there was a bona fide 
dispute pertaining to whether the wages were due. 
Appellant concedes that, in many instances the rights of 
employees need to be protected, due to the unequal bargaining 
power inherent in many employer-employee relationships, and that 
the legislative intent behind the applicable wage statutes is that 
this protection be given. However, the legislature clearly did 
not intend to protect those employees with equal or greater 
bargaining power, who use the statute as a devise to gain their 
improper ends. Asay is also an attorney, and had a far greater 
knowledge of computers than those working at Zoll & Branch, as has 
been admitted by Asay. Mr. Asay is a disgruntled former employee 
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who did not even come close to meeting the required standard for 
his employment agreement with Appellant Zoll & Branch. 
In addition, Mr. Asay sabotaged Appellant's property, and 
otherwise caused damage in time and money to Appellant and damage 
to clients, whose briefs and work product were not completed on 
time, and but for the staff of Appellant working nights, said 
damage would have been extensive [R 980, R 1116]. Asay even sued 
Zoll & Branch regarding the criminal claim of a bounced check, and 
cited the case as a felony that Zoll & Branch had to defend 
throughout the litigation process, only to see that part of the 
case dropped and dismissed on the morning of the trial [R 936, R 
1134 at line 25]. 
This Court should not reward this behavior, and extend 
blanket protection to Asay due solely to the fact that he was the 
"employee" in this situation, while failing to protect the 
employer, Zoll & Branch. Nor should this Court award attorney's 
fees based upon any purported wrongful behavior of Appellant as 
the employer in this situation, or as a result of Appellee's 
claims that Appellant has delayed the litigation process. In 
fact, when this case was before Judge Palmer in the Third Circuit 
Court, Asay's request for attorney's fees pursuant to a Motion to 
Compel Discovery was denied [see copy of Order attached hereto as 
Exhibit "C"], and Appellee is again attempting to recover fees 
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based upon the argument that Appellant has caused said delay. 
Finally, all that is needed to be shown in order for the 
Appellant to prevail is the fact that Asay caused damages to Zoll 
& Branch of over $1175.00f which claim by Appellant has not been 
rebutted by Appellee. In that case, there is a set-off of this 
amount against the amount purportedly owed to Asay, and no 
attorney's fees would be allowed, nor would the penalty statute be 
applicable, in that the wages were not "justly due". There is no 
evidence rebutting the expenses of Zoll & Branch, in correcting 
the damage caused by Asay. 
V. THE AMOUNT CLAIMED FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES IS NOT 
REASONABLE 
In addition, attorney's fees in the amount claimed by 
Appellee should not be awarded, inasmuch as they are clearly 
excessive and unreasonable. Appellee alleged that the attorney's 
fees claimed are "reasonable," in accordance with the guidelines 
set forth in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (1985). 
The law pertaining to establishing a reasonable attorney's fee is 
well established in Utah. The Utah Supreme Court, in Dixie, set 
forth four practical guidelines for making this determination: 
1. A court must first look to what legal work was 
actually performed. Padded and duplicative time is not work that 
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has been performed, and therefore is not recoverable, and that the 
amount of time actually spent is not necessarily the amount of 
time reasonably spent. Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 
1983). In the case of Wicat Securities Litigation, 726 F.Supp 
671, 735-736 (Utah 1987), it was further held that, "The word 
"review" seems to be a catch-all category with great versatility 
in counsels* application. It is also a signal for the padding of 
hours." In counsel's Affidavit in support of augmenting attorney's 
fees, the "review/revision" of pleadings, memoranda or strategies 
appears in thirty-four of the 74 entries [see copy of billing 
sheets, attached hereto as Exhibit "D"]. 
2. Second, a court must determine how much of the work 
performed was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the 
matter. In making this determination, the court must exclude work 
which was duplicative, excessive, and the result of which did not 
merit the fees. Ramos, supra. In the present case, there are 
instances of duplicative and excessive work [see Exhibit "D"]. 
3. Third, a court must determine whether the billing 
rate is consistent with the rates customarily charged in the 
locality for similar services, and evidence of this is part of the 
burden of proof which the party seeking fees must meet. 
4. Fourth, a court must determine whether there are 
circumstances which require consideration of additional factors, 
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listed in CPR Rule 1.5, as set forth in Appellant's Brief. 
In addition to the requirement that the amount being claimed 
be a "reasonable" amount, it has been held that the attorney 
claiming an amount for attorney's fees must present evidence, 
including records sufficiently detailed to determine the criteria 
of Dixie, supra. It was held in Ramos, supra, that attorneys in 
this situation must "keep meticulous contemporaneous time records 
to present to the court upon request." These records must provide 
a specific break down of hours allotted to specific tasks. 
Therefore, compound time entries, listing and lumping several 
tasks together, do not meet this requirement. Moreover, Utah 
courts have held that this level of meticulous timekeeping is 
required. Cottonwood Mall v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266 (Utah 1992). In 
the present case, there are numerous examples of compound time 
entries, and lumping of several tasks together. It is clear that 
the entries in Appellee's billing sheets are not sufficiently 
documented and sufficiently broken down to meet the burden of 
proof meriting award of attorney's fees [see Exhibit "D"]. 
CONCLUSION 
There was a bona fide dispute as to the initial amount of 
wages purportedly due to Asay, which amount was only $1176.75. and 
which was paid by Zoll & Branch to the Court. The Appellant 
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itself suffered losses as the result of correcting the damage 
caused by Appellee, namely as the result of having to hire experts 
to fix the sabotaged computer system, having to redo critical 
legal work hidden on the computer, and resulting from the loss of 
value of the computer. These losses clearly and easily exceeded 
the disputed wage amount of $1176.75, which Appellant continues to 
maintain was not justly due to Asay. 
In addition, Appellant has tendered and paid the amount to 
Court, the methods for which constituted a valid tender, in light 
of the circumstances of this case. Appellant did not have control 
over this amount, and Appellee has admitted that he could have 
easily retrieved the amount and that he knowingly chose not to do 
so. Therefore, the wages which were not "justly due" in the first 
place were in effect paid in this case and the wage statutes 
providing for penalties and attorney's fees do not apply. 
In any event the penalty should not have accrued, inasmuch as 
there was a bona fide dispute over the wage amount, the amount was 
not willfully withheld upon separation of the employee, and the 
amount claimed for attorney's fees is clearly excessive. The 
factors of a "willful" witholding of wages, the reasonableness of 
fees, and the credibility of Tom Branch, among other crucial 
matters, were never even taken into account by the trial court, 
nor were they made a part of the Findings of Fact. 
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The Court should reverse the lower court's judgment and 
remand the case for a redetermination. There are critical and 
undisputed factsf with which the trial court's judgment and 
Findings of Fact is inconsistent. This case must be clarified and 
given a full opportunity for trial, in order to avoid a 
miscarriage of justice to Appellant and to employers throughout 
Utah. 
DATED this I *? day of April, 1994. 
\ \ ~M pJ^' 
B. Ray Zoll v 
Attorney for Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
f ^ ^ 
foregoing
 f with postage prepaid thereon f on this J ?_ day of 
April, 1994f to the following: 
Michael N. Zundel 
David E. Smoot 
Jeffrey J. Devashrayee 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellee CO -0
 2 ]V 
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*f *X«*Jf CiVyjLO. \nJ\J\J„ 
Tom D. Branch (3997) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
360 West 5300 South, Suite 360 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Telephone (801)262-1500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ZOLL & BRANCH, 
Plaintiff 
TENDER OF PAYMENT 
V. 
ALAN ASAY, 
Defendant. 
: Civil No. 
: Judge 
COMES NOW Zoll & Branch, Plaintiff in the above-entitled 
case, and submits to the Court the sum of $1176.75. This sum 
represents the amount claimed by the Defendant to be owed to him 
by Plaintiff for wages. Plaintiff requests that the Court hold 
these funds pending resolution of the above-entitled matter. 
Dated this /")^day of December. 
Attorney for ylaintiff 
EXHiBiTji 
THE COURT: GO AHEAD. 
MR. ZOLL: AS YOU RECALL, JUDGE, THIS IS A 
CASE' OF $1,176.65. IT WAS A WAGE DISPUTE IN WHICH THE 
MONEY WAS TENDERED OR PAID INTO THE COURT. AND THEN A 
BANKRUPTCY WAS FILED, AND THERE WERE COUNTER-CLAIMS. OUT 
POSITION IS, THIS IS A CASE WHERE THE COURT SAID THAT 
THIS CASE SHOULD STAY AT CIRCUIT COURT, IT WASN'*T EVEN 
WORTHY OF OF THE TIME OF THIS COURT. AND THE CASE WAS 
SUBMITTED, IN TWO AND A-HALF HOURS, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, 
FOR EACH SIDE TO PRESENT THEIR CASE. 
UNBEKNOWN TO US, WAS THERE SOME $12,000 OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES THAT HAD BEEN RACKED UP IN THE CASE, 
WHICH WAS OUT OF CONTROL BEFORE WE ACTUALLY HAD THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO GO TO TRIAL. 
WE THEN HAD THIS TWO HOURS, THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
GO THE TWO AND A-HALF HOURS. 
WE LEFT WITNESSES STANDING IN THE HALL, AND HAD 
A FIVE MINUTE CLOSING ARGUMENT, AND NO CROSS-EXAMINATION 
ON THE INITIAL FEES. 
THIS WAS A CASE, JUDGE, WHERE THE!; WE WERE 
DE:;:ED OUR OBJECTIONS, OUR NEW TRIAL, AND OUR BOND, 
THERE WAS NO HEARING--
THE COURT: WHAT DOES THIS HAVE TO DO WITH 
ATTORNEY'S FEES? 
A. THIS HAS TO DO-- SO THAT YOU CAN PUT IT ALL 
B yj •» V ** r"\ ' T / "? C A "» \ * H^fi X _ »-' ^ i iJ
 v ~ O v > / 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2300 Scuth 360 :i^c 
• 7 - , • •. ... •> r
 f-\ 
%j i. x i< — .v , «.-
Salt Lake City, Utah 3;i?.3 
Tal=phcn-i; £301* :'3~r1500 
— -i J i-nCi _»JL-.*.iJ .. -u . . - .* - -. * J j . i i w/A .w*ijj. ^ . / \ A u '.•>-.",.•! i -i X 
3ALT LAK3 DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
SOLL & BRANCH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALAN ASAY, 
Dijf a i d a n t . 
DISCOVERY ORDER 
AND DENIAL OF HOTIOII3 
Civil No. 383013765 
7VDGE PALMER 
Tho parties 'loll 1 Srviiich by ?.rA through its attorney 
loll wil Al:ir: Ac.;y by ?.n.:I through his attorney Michael 
l^f^r.: thi.2 Honor ?^1J Court to" i:.-;uc th3. 
c „, •» -< ^  -» -i ^ .. . ; ,„ ., • f . i_ • ,. . , . 
'. r c » .. ?.» 
depcsiti.cn of Defendant Alii*; Asay, 
2- Djf sndai'it' s Motion for Protective Order to prev3i:t 
the taking of the deposition of Alan Assy. 
1 F>^M!R!T /" 
2. Discovery s h a l l be ccr ipleted wi th in 30 days from 
the execut ion of t h i s Order* 
3. In th£2 d e p o s i t i o n s to b j 3c;hw»duled by the p a r t i e s , 
aach p^ r ty .shall have four hours each for purposes of t ak ing and 
conductin-y th;- j:ui;:.inat:iin if 3 . Ray Zol l :4nd Alan Asay. 
•1. SSS^Tsan'ctions' "or^"£ccTsf*ar\T Vwal?^^^ 
JJi^jSft4*POJsi'tio-ns -scheduled pursuant <to ' tiie*jKU&ual<^cui$^^ 
2 
h.-ir.-.by certify LV..it 
of the going, po:'..;(;e prepaid, on this / f - day o 
. - . . ^ & £ % L _ ' 1233 , t.-. 
"> -^ ^ T7 - ,
 c * ~ «-»•*••- V T1 r v ' - * - A ^ 
*j2fca4jL--<fi .xfc^&tiK&L 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
LEGAL SERVICES EXHIBIT 
A summary of legal services rendered and costs advanced on behalf of Alan B. Asay against Zoll & 
Branch incurred in connection with post-judgment motions: 
TIMEKEEPER 
Attorneys 
William G. Marsden - WGM 
Michael N. Zundel - MNZ 
Michael N. Zundel - MNZ 
David E. Smoot - DES 
Jeffrey J. Devashrayee - JJD 
Jeffrey J. Devashrayee - JJD 
Kent W. Hansen - KWH 
Paralegal 
Carol A. Lynn - CAL 
SUMMARY 
HOURS 
0.30 
0.50 
16.10 
2.00 
1.40 
14.30 
46.00 
14.00 
RATE/HR. 
$145.00 
130.00 
140.00 
100.00 
85.00 
90.00 
75.00 
60.00 
AMOUNT 
$43.50 
65.00 
2,254.00 
200.00 
119.00 
1,287.00 
3,450.00 
840.00 
TOTAL FEES 
TOTAL COSTS 
94.60 $8,258.50 
$514.49 
TOTAL FEES AND COSTS $8,772.99 
CAL\D»76 
\QPRO\ASAYFEE.WQ1 (A226..F248] 
' " : ; L i , ' 
ATTORNEY FEES fr^'"^ 
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[ DATE ATTY_ -^DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT 1 
06/10/93 JJD Review billing files'and judgment executed in .80 68.00 
case; draft Motion to Augment Award of Costs 
and Attorneys' Fees and affidavit in support 
thereof. 
06/11/93 JJD Review pleadings and other materials in case .40 34.00 
file in preparation for drafting Motion to 
Augment Award of Costs and Attorneys' Fees 
and affidavit in support thereof; review Ex Parte 
Motion of Zoll & Branch to Stay Execution 
Pending Location of File. 
06/14/93 JJD Complete revisions to Motion to Augment .20 17.00 
Award of Costs and Attorneys' Fees and 
affidavit in support thereof and submit to M. 
Zundel for review. 
06/14/93 MNZ Review and revise motion to augment .50 65.00 
attorneys' fees. 
07/19/93 JJD Review Supplemental Brief in Support of 1.70 153.00 
Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative Motion 
to Alter or Amend Judgment; review case law 
cited by Zoll & Branch in supplemental brief; 
review trial brief and other pleadings and 
materials in case file; draft Memorandum in 
Opposition to Supplemental Brief. 
07/20/93 JJD Complete revisions to Memorandum in 1.00 90.00 
Opposition to Supplemental Brief in Support of 
Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative to 
Alter or Amend Judgment. 
07/20/93 MNZ Review and approve Memorandum in .20 28.00 
Opposition to Zoll & Branch's Motion for New 
Trial. 
07/22/93 MNZ Conference call from court clerk and Ray Zoll's .20 28.00 
secretary re: scheduling of hearing. 
07/29/93 MNZ Conference call to court re: Mr. Zoll's request .20 28.00 
to schedule hearing on Asay's motion to 
augment judgment for additional fees incurred. 
2 
| DATE ATTY DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT j 
08/02/93 MNZ 
08/03/93 
08/05/93 
08/06/93 
08/09/93 
JJD 
JJD 
JJD 
JJD 
08/11/93 JJD 
08/12/93 
08/30/93 
08/30/93 
JJD 
JJD 
MNZ 
Prepare for hearing on motion to augment fees 
and appear at hearing; obtain judgment 
augmenting fees and vacating stay and 
ordering transfer of bond money to Alan Asay; 
conference with court clerk re: transfer of bond 
proceeds; conference call to American 
Investment Bank with clerk;vtravel to bank and 
cash certificate of deposit; travel to court and 
obtain court clerk's endorsement on check. 
Conference with M. Zundel re: status of case 
and assignment to draft Partial Satisfaction of 
Judgment. , L ^ « \ b" f 
Review pleadings in case file; calculate interest 
accrued on judgment amount and determine 
balance of principal and interest owed to A. 
Asay; draft PartiahSatisfaction of Judgment. 
Begiitrevising Pferti&l Satisfaction of Judgment. 
Review Utah Code to determine change in 
statutory judgment rate ar^d whether such ^ 
change is retroactive; review pleadings in casa 
file; complete revisions to Partial Satisfaction of 
Judgment and submit to M. Zundel for review. , 
C_Further revise Partial Satisfaction of Judgment; • 
review Notice of Appeal and other attached \ 
documents received from Zoll & Branch; traveO 
to Third District Court and review case \\\e to 
determine whether supersedeas bond has , 
been/approved/^ ulxJ ^u,t < u)%' ^ ^ ' ^ 
/ Finaliz^Partial Satisfaction of Judgment and- ^ 
file with Court. 
Conference with M. Zundel re: response to Zoll 
& Branch's Motion to Restore Supersedeas 
Bond; review motion. 
Review Zoll's motion to re-instate supersedeas 
bond and conference with J. Devashrayee re: 
same. 
3.30 462.00 
.20 18.00 
1.90 
.20 r-
J" 
Sf\ 
/1.10 
171.00 
1
 18.00 
99.00 
(1.90) 171.00 
s- ( 
.30) 
.40 
.20 
27.00 
36.00 
28.00 
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DATE ATTY 
r 
DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNTJ 
08/31/93 
09/02/93 
09/03/93 
09/03/93 
09/06/93 
09/06/93 
09/07/93 
09/08/93 
09/09/93 
09/09/93 
09/10/93 
JJD V Review pleadings in case file and)begin to draft .70 63.00 
A ^Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to 
Xy Restore Supersedeas Bond. 
JJD ^Review pleadings;in case file; complete draft of 1.30 117.00 
memorandum irf opposition to motion to 
restore supersedeas bond and begin revising 
same. 
CAL Calculate accrued interest between 8/2/93 and 1.80 108.00 
>A 9/3/93; prepare garnishment papers for West 
iy One and American Investment banks. 
JJD ^Review pleadings ir) case; complete revisions 1.20 108.00 
taiTieiiiorandum iri opposition to motion to 
restore supersedeas bond and submit to M. 
Zundel for review. 
JJD r Review files in preparation for drafting .10 9.00 
memqrandurr) in opposition to motion to 
restore supersedeas bond to be filed in 
Supreme Court. 
MNZ Review and revise memorandum in opposition .20 28.00 
to Zoll's motion to restore bond. 
JJD Conduct research re filing of motion to stay .80 72.00 
proceedings and execution of judgment in 
proper court; begin drafting memorandum in 
opposition to restore supersedeas bond to be 
filed in Supreme Court. 
JJD Complete draft of memorandum in opposition .60 54.00 
to motion to restore 
supersedeas bond to be filed in Supreme 
Court and begin revising same. 
CAL Telephone conference with Chuck Johnson, .30 18.00 
Third District Court clerk, re issuance of Writs 
of Garnishment and review of pleadings filed 
with the Court. 
JJD Complete revisions to memorandum in .50 45.00 
opposition to motion to restore supersedeas 
bond to be filed in Supreme Court and submit 
to M. Zundel for review. 
MNZ Call from Judge Murphy's clerk re: scheduling .20 28.00 
of hearing motion to restore bond. 
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DATE ATTY DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT^ 
09/13/93 CAL Telephone conference with Chuck, Third .60 36.00 
District Court; prepare cover letters to 
Constable Collins1 office with issued Writs of 
Garnishment for West One and American 
Investment Banks; telephone conference with 
Jack, Constable Collins1 office re service of 
Writs. 
09/13/93 MNZ Prepare for and attend hearing on Zoll's 1.80 252.00 
motion to restore bond; conference with W. 
Marsden re: advisability of requesting contempt ' y \ , 
sanctions against Mr. Zoll (orfjalsifying court < J'J 
records. # / 
09/13/93 WGM Office conference [MNZ] re execution issues .30 43.50 
and alternatives. 
09/14/93 JJD Telephone call from American Investment Bank .10 9.00 
re Zoll & Branch garnishment. 
09/16/93 CAL Review WestOne's response to Interrogatories .10 6.00 
to garnishee. 
09/17/93 CAL Telephone conference with Gayle Campbell re .80 48.00 
transcript of hearing on 8/2/93; telephone 
conference with Cheryl Watkins, American 
Investment Bank re Zoll & Branch CD; 
telephone conference with Carolyn Palmer, 
WestOne Bank, re status of accounts; 
telephone conference with Rhonda Harwood 
and Claudia Parsons, WestOne Bank Legal 
Processes, re date account was closed. 
09/17/93 JJD Review reply of Zoll & Branch to motion to y/.J10 9.00 
restore supersedeas bond. \ ^ rj* 
09/20/93 CAL Draft Writ of Execution and Praecipe and v ^ < 2.30 138.00 
prepare required notices; telephone
 N \ 
conference with MNZ and Deputy Kimble re 
service; telephone calls to DMV and Salt Lake 
County Recorder and Tax Assessor re property 
held by Zoll & Branch; file maintenance. 
09/20/93 MNZ Prepare for and appear at hearing before the 1.40 196.00 
Supreme Court and argue in opposition to 
Zoll's motion to restore bond. 
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DATE ATTY DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT 
09/21/93 
09/24/93 
10/12/93 
CAL 
09/21/93 
09/21/93 
09/22/93 
09/23/93 
MNZ 
KWH 
KWH 
KWH 
CAL 
09/24/93 
09/24/93 
09/24/93 
09/24/93 
10/11/93 
10/11/93 
10/12/93 
JJD 
MNZ 
DES 
KWH 
KWH 
MNZ 
CAL 
KWH 
Review Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law dated 2/17/93, verify judgment calculations 
and prepare exhibit to Writ of Execution. 
Conference with paralegal re: collection of 
judgment. 
Legal research re: response to docketing 
statement; draft Motion for Summary 
Disposition. 
Draft Motion for Summary Disposition. 
Draft Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Disposition. 
Draft cover letter to sheriff's department re 
service of Writ of Execution; assist KWH and 
DES with final preparations of Motion for 
Summary Disposition. 
Conference with K. Hansen re strategy for 
drafting motion for summary decision. 
Review and revise execution on the Praecipe 
and letter to Sheriff re: collection of judgment 
amount. 
Review memoranda and finalize document for 
filing. 
Draft Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Disposition. 
Review Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition 
to Motion for Summaiy Disposition. Draft Reply! 
Memorandum. 
1.20 
.20 
3.25 ' 
4.90 
.75 i 
.90 
.20 
.30 
) 
r L 
2.00 
y 
5.60) 
Prepare letter to Alan Asay. 
Research records at county assessor's and 
county recorder's offices re real property 
currently owned or recently sold by Zoll & 
Branch PC and obtain copies of pertinent 
documents. 
Draft Reply Memorandum. Edit changes to 
Reply Memorandum. 
\L 
L j-^r 
.20 
.80 
2.40 ) 
72.00 
28.00 
243.75 
367.50 
56.25 
54.00 
18.00 
42.00 
200.00 
420.00 
3.30 J 247.50 
28.00 
48.00 
180.00 
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\ DATE ATTY DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT 
10/12/93 
10/13/93 
10/13/93 
MNZ 
KWH 
MNZ 
10/14/93 
12/23/93 
12/23/93 
12/23/93 
12/27/93 
12/27/93 
KWH 
10/14/93 
10/28/93 
12/13/93 
12/13/93 
12/21/93 
MNZ 
MNZ 
MNZ 
KWH 
CAL 
CAL 
MNZ 
KWH 
CAL 
MNZ 
6.30 472.50 
.90 126.00 
Review rebuttal brief in support of motion for .30 42.00 
summary disposition. 
Draft response to "Affidavit of Recusal." 
Review file at Third District Court. 
Review Affidavit of Prejudice filed by Mr. Zoll; 
conference with K. Hansen re: preparation of 
response to affidavit. 
Edit Memorandum in Response to 5.00 375.00 
Plaintiff/Counterclaimant's Affidavit of Recusal. 
Draft motion for supersedeas bond. 
Review and revise response to Zoil's motion to 
restore supersedeas bond. 
Review Zoil's memorandum in rebuttal and in 
support of recusal. 
Appear at hearing on Ray Zoil's motion for 
determination amount of supersedeas bond. 
Attend at hearing on Motion to Restore Bond. 
Telephone conferences with MNZ and Deputy 
Kimble re service of Writ of Execution. 
Recalculate interest on judgment and prepare 1.00 60.00 
Writ of Execution, Praecipe and required 
notices. 
Review Zoil's proposed supersedeas bond and .60 84.00 
dictate letter to Ray Zoll. 
Office conference with MNZ re: response to .20 15.00 
•Objection to Bond" and "Corporate 
Supersedeas Bond." 
Prepare final documents for service of Writ of 1.20 72.00 
Execution; telephone call to Third District Court 
re papers filed by Zoll & Branch; draft cover 
letter for MNZ to Deputy Kimble. 
Dictate order on supersedeas bond; call to 1,50 210.00 
clerk of court re: issuance of writ of execution 
and dictate praecipe. 
.50 
.20 
2.00 
2.00 
.50 
70.00 
28.00 
280.00 
150.00 
30.00 
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| DATE ATTY DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT j 
12/27/93 
12/28/93 
KWH 
CAL 
12/28/93 MNZ 
12/28/93 KWH 
12/29/93 
12/29/93 
12/30/93 
12/31/93 
MNZ 
KWH 
KWH 
KWH 
Draft Objection to Sufficiency of Supersedeas 
Bond; Deliver Writs of Execution to court clerk 
and sheriff's offices. 
Conference with Sgt. Peterson re lockout on 
Zoll & Branch; telephone conference with 
Deputy Rook re execution on Zoll & Branch 
property; telephone calls to moving companies 
to arrange for moving company to assist with 
execution on property; telephone conference 
with Deputy Kimble re execution; travel to Zoll 
& Branch's offices, meet deputies and movers 
in preparation for execution. 
Call to attorney Jay Stone re: sheriff's 
procedure in executing on property and Zoll & 
Branch; conference with paralegal re: 
arrangement for movers to be at Zoll & 
Branch's offices; call moving company; call 
attorney Jay Stone re: sheriff's willingness to 
levy execution. 
Draft Objection to Sufficiency of Supersedeas 
Bond. Attorney conference with MNZ re: same. 
Attorney conference with MNZ re: Motion to 
Augment. 
Review and revise objection to sufficiency of 
supersedeas bond. 
Draft Objection to Sufficiency of Supersedeas 
Bond; Draft response to Objection to Bond. 
Edit final changes and print Objection to 
Sufficiency of Supersedeas Bond. 
Draft Memorandum in Response to Zoll & 
Branch's Objection to Bond. 
4.00 300.00 
2.50 150.00 
1.20 168.00 
4.00 K 
.50 
2.20 
.60 
1.50 
300.00 
70.00 
165.00 
45.00 
112.50 
TOTAL 94.60 8,258.50 
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UNBILLED COSTS ADVANCED 
07/01/93 
07/12/93 
07/20/93 
07/21/93 
07/21/93 
07/21/93 
07/22/93 
07/26/93 
07/27/93 
07/27/93 
07/31/93 
08/11/93 
08/12/93 
08/12/93 
08/12/93 
08/17/93 
08/23/93 
08/24/93 
08/31/93 
09/03/93 
09/03/93 
09/03/93 
09/03/93 
09/03/93 
09/08/93 
09/08/93 
09/10/93 
09/10/93 
09/13/93 
09/13/93 
09/13/93 
09/13/93 
09/13/93 
09/17/93 
09/17/93 
09/20/93 
09/20/93 
09/21/93 
Postage charge 
, Courier fee^ 
Postage charge 
' Courier fee 
Postage charge 
Photocopy charge 
( Courier fee ^ 
Photocopy charge 
Courier fee ^ 
Postage charge 
Photocopy charge 
v Courier fee * 
Photocopy charge 
Postage charge 
Postage charge 
Court copies 
Third Judicial District Court 
Copy of Order Augmenting Judgement and 
Releasing Cash Bond 
( Courier fee J) 
Photocopy charge 
American Investment Bank 
Interrogatories 
Third Judicial District Court 
Issue Writ of Garnishment 
Westone Bank 
Interrogatories 
Third Judicial District Court 
Issue Writ of Garnishment: Westone Bank 
Postage charge 
^Courier fee 
Postage charge 
Courier fee \ 
Courier fee ) 
\ Courier fee / 
Courier fee 
Photocopy charge 
Postage charge 
Postage charge 
Courier fee 
(
 Constable Office, Inc. 
Courier fee; 
( Courier fee 
Postage charge 
$ .52 
5.00 
.52 
5.00 
.52 
.30 
5.00 
.45 
8.00 
.29 
3.00 
5.00 
.30 
.29 
.29 
3.50 
1.00 
5.00 
1.95 
10.00 
5.00 
10.00 
5.00 
1.16 
5.00 
.52 
5.00 
9.00 
7.00 
5.00 
3.15 
.52 
.52 
5.00 
34.00 
5.00 
8.00 
.29 
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09/24/93 
09/24/93 
09/24/93 
09/24/93 
09/27/93 
09/27/93 
09/30/93 
09/30/93 
09/30/93 
09/30/93 
10/01/93 
10/11/93 
10/12/93 
10/12/93 
10/13/93 
10/13/93 
10/13/93 
10/14/93 
10/14/93 
10/15/93 
10/18/93 
10/30/93 
10/30/93 
11/22/93 
11/22/93 
11/30/93 
11/30/93 
' Courier fee 
Third Judicial District Court 
Issue Writ of Execution 
Salt Lake County Sheriff 
Service of Writ of Execution 
Postage charge 
\ Courier fee ) 
Postage charge i 
Photocopy charge 
Photocopy charge 
Photocopy charge 
Photocopy charge 
i>» 
\ 
\ 
Postage charge i 
Postage charge 
Long distance phone charges 
Postage charge 
Gayle B. Campbell 
Transcript in hearing of 08/01/93. 
v Courier fee^ 
Postage charge 
< Courier fee? 
Postage charge 
< Courier fed) 
Postage charge 
Photocopy charge 
Photocopy charge 
Telefax charge 
Telefax charge 
Postage charge 
Photocopy charge 
Total Unbilled Cost! > Advanced: 
5.00 
5.00 
100.00 
2.59 
5.00 
.29 
64.65 
44.10 
2.70 
18.45 
2.90 
1.21 
.36 
.52 
37.00 
5.00 
1.67 
5.00 
1.96 
5.00 
.75 
14.55 
19.80 
.50 
1.50 
.75 
3.15 
$514.49 
\CAUD\576 
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